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Article 4

FOREWORD: DEMOCRACY IN A NEW
AMERICA
JULIUS CHAMBERS*

One of my earliest memories about voting rights in the United
States occurred in 1954, when my father was denied the right to
register and vote. I was very upset with the unfairness. Everyone
should have the right to vote, and to have that vote count. My
father's experience was the beginning of my determination to try to
affect change.
Since then, Congress has passed legislation that promised to
ensure the right to vote. But the road from the type of
disenfranchisement that my father experienced in 1954 to the
complete realization of the promise that everyone should have the
right to vote has not been straight or smooth. Every congressional
effort to improve voting opportunities has brought about some
progress, and has been encumbered with limitations. In 1957,
Congress passed legislation that created the Civil Rights Division
within the Department of Justice and the Commission on Civil
Rights.1 This legislation authorized the Attorney General to
intervene in and initiate lawsuits seeking injunctive relief against
violators of the Fifteenth Amendment.! Legislation passed in 1960
permitted federal courts to appoint voting referees to conduct voter
registration following a judicial finding of voter discrimination The
primary obstacle to the effectiveness of these legislative efforts was
the necessity of litigation, on a case-by-case basis, to compel
compliance in those areas where resistance to minority
* Former Chancellor, North Carolina Central University. A.B., 1958, North
Carolina Central University; M.A., 1959, Univeristy of Michigan - Ann Arbor; L.L.B.J.D.,
1962, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; L.L.M., 1963, Columbia University.
Chancellor Chambers served as Chancellor of North Carolina Central University from
1993 to 2001. From 1984 to 1993, he served as Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund. Chancellor Chambers has litigated several landmark civil rights cases
before the United States Supreme Court, including Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education and Shaw v. Hunt.
1. Act of Sept. 9, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, pt.1, § 101, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as

amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (1994)).

2. Id.
3. Act of May 6, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, title VI, § 60, 74 Stat. 96 (codified as

amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (1994)).
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enfranchisement was great.
Since the latter half of the 1800s, an ongoing, systematic
campaign to reverse the political gains achieved by African
Americans during Reconstruction developed.
Violence and
intimidation to prevent the enfranchisement of African Americans
went largely unpunished and unabated, necessitating the passage of
the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871. 4 The Act was an "attempt to force
acceptance of black suffrage in the South and end intimidation and
violence." 5 Laws implementing tactics including poll taxes, literacy
tests, requirements of vouchers of "good character," grandfather
clauses, and laws imposing disenfranchisement for crimes of "moral
turpitude," were passed by many state legislatures immediately after
those who sought the exclusion of African Americans from the
political process regained control.' These laws were then applied in a
racially discriminatory manner.
Through time-consuming and
expensive litigation, these laws had to be attacked one by one. As
one discriminatory voting practice was declared unconstitutional, or
held to violate the federal legislation passed at that point, new
practices were devised and implemented to maintain the
disenfranchisement of minorities.
Most recently, the Voting Rights Act of 19657 brought about
significant advances in the ability of African Americans and other
minorities to participate in our democratic government, on both the
national and local levels. One of the most effective features of the
Voting Rights Act, section 5, prohibited the implementation of new
voting practices without prior approval by the Department of Justice
or the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia.' Thus,
resistant jurisdictions were no longer able to simply replace one
obstacle to minority voting with another. Between 1965 and 1969, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 5, construed
the Voting Rights Act liberally, and supported the Department of

4. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (1994)).
5.

1 REFERENCE LIBRARY OF BLACK AMERICA, SIGNIFICANT DOCUMENTS IN

AMERICAN HISTORY 145 (Harry A. Ploski & James Williams eds., 1990).
6. James E. Alt, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black and White Voter
Registrationin the South, in QUIET REvOLuTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1965-1990, at 351, 354-56 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman
eds., 1994).
7. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974e (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
8. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
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Justice in enforcing its mandate. 9 Some of the success of the Voting
Rights Act was immediate and dramatic, and has continued. In
Alabama, the rate of African-American voter registration doubled in
three years. 10 In Mississippi, African-American voter registration
went from 28,500 in 1964 to 251,000 in 1968.11 The overall percentage
of voting-age African Americans registered to vote in the South grew
from 43 percent in 1964 to 62 percent in 1968.12 The number of
African-American elected officials in the South went from seventytwo in 1964 to nearly 5,000 by 1995.1" Because of redistricting plans
that were sensitive to minorities, more African Americans were
elected to Congress in 1992 and 1994 than at any other time since
Reconstruction. 4 Notwithstanding the degree of success in increasing
minority representation, the Voting Rights Act, as others before it, is
subject to both internal and external limitations. Perhaps, in part,
because of its success, it is now a law under siege.
Opponents of the Voting Rights Act raise several criticisms,
some valid. One criticism is that the race-conscious drawing of voting
district lines-a practice that certainly did not originate with the
Voting Rights Act, but has been adopted as a primary means of
compliance with its mandate-is in direct violation of previously
established constitutional principles.' 5 Opponents argue that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits the drawing of district lines
primarily on the basis of race, regardless of the motivation for doing
so. 16 Whether members of specific minority groups necessarily share
the same interests, agendas, and would necessarily prefer the same
candidates in office, also remains a contested question. 17 As the
9. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding section 5
of the Voting Rights Act on the basis that case-by-case challenges of discriminatory voting
practices had proven inadequate to eliminate them); see also Allen v. State Board of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (recognizing that gerrymandered district boundaries or atlarge elections could be used to dilute minority voting strength).
10. Nancy K. Bannon, The Voting Rights Act: Over the Hill At Age 30?, 22 HUM. RTs.
Q., Fall 1995, at 10.
11. Id.
12. IL
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 969-72 (1996); see Robinson Everett, Redistricting in
North Carolina-A PersonalPerspective, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1301, 1311-12 (2001); Katharine
Butler, A FunctionalAnalysis of Potential Voting Rights Act Liability May Demonstrate
that the Intentional Creation of Black Remedial Districts Cannot be Justified, 79 N.C. L.
REv. 1431, 1460 (2001).
16. See Everett, supranote 15, at 1301; cf Butler, supranote 15, at 1461-63.
17. See Leo F. Estrada, Making the Voting Rights Act Relevant to the New
Demographicsof America: A Response to Johnson and Farrell,79 N.C. L. REV. 1283, 1286
(2001).
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number of distinct minority groups increases, identifying which ones
are eligible for specific consideration in ensuring their ability to elect
"representatives of their choice," becomes difficult and
conceptualizing how to provide for each of them, without infringing
on the rights of the others becomes even more challenging. The
preservation of geographically defined district boundaries that
facilitate the promotion of local interests is still held as an important
value by many.
As the tenor of much scholarly and political opinion seems to be
shifting away from support for the Voting Rights Act, clearly the Act
does not seem to enjoy the support it once received from the
Supreme Court. At the end of the fifteen-year period (1965-1980)
immediately following passage of the Act, during which increases in
minority voting and representation continued unabated, the Supreme
Court signaled a shift of its own. It held, in Mobile v. Bolden,i" that a
constitutional claim of minority vote dilution must include proof of a
racially discriminatory purpose.19 Congress responded to the Court's
decision with the 1982 amendment to section 2, clarifying that a
discriminatory purpose is not required for a claim under that
section.20
Nonetheless, the Court has continued its course of narrowing the
reach of the Voting Rights Act. In Thornburg v. Gingles2t the
Supreme Court set out the specific elements for a vote dilution
claim.22 Though criticized by proponents of race-neutral, "colorblind" voting practices as creating more difficultly for plaintiffs
challenging state affirmative action in voting, Gingles might also be
viewed as raising the bar for minority plaintiffs to successfully
24
challenge the deliberate dilution of their votes.23 Shaw v. Reno
established that the use of race as a predominant factor in redrawing
district lines is subject to strict scrutiny.' By basing its holding on the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court converted a constitutional
18. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
19. Id. at 72-73.
20. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)).
21. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
22. The plaintiff minority group must be 1) sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district; 2) "politically cohesive," and
3) able to show that majority bloc voting consistently defeats its efforts to elect a
representative of its choice. See id. at 50.
23. See generally id. (holding that new criteria must be met before a plaintiff minority
group could win a voter dilution claim).
24. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
25. Id. at 644.
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amendment that had as its original purpose the protection of African
Americans into an effective weapon, now employed by those who
seek to reverse the political gains achieved by minorities under the
2 6 held that section 2 is not
Voting Rights Act. Johnson v. DeGrandy
27
violated by a failure to maximize majority-minority voting districts,
but in Miller v. Johnson,18 the Court preserved the Voting Rights Act
by invalidating a "max black" districting plan the state believed had
been encouraged by the Department of Justice.2 9 The Court stated
that traditional, race-neutral districting principles could not be
subordinated to race without a compelling interest 0 Furthermore,
compliance with the Justice Department and the Voting Rights Acts,
in Miller, did not constitute a compelling interest?' In Bush v. Vera,32
the Court invalidated three majority-minority districts in areas of
33
Texas that were predominantly African-American and Hispanic.
And, in what some view as a stunning defeat for minority voting
interests, the Court held last year in Reno v. Bossier Parish School
Board' that the "purpose" and "effect" of voting practices, which are
prohibited by section 5 is limited to retrogressive purpose and
retrogressive effect.3 5 Even where the presence of a racially
discriminatory purpose or effect of some other, non-retrogressive
nature, is clearly present, the Justice Department has no authority to
deny preclearance. Such plans or practices must be challenged de
novo, and after adoption, under section 2.36
The sponsors of, and participants in, this Symposium are to be
commended for promoting the discussion, and the debate that follow.
Herein, we have a wide range of ideas that cover the spectrum of
possibilities for addressing the issue of minority voting rights.

26. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
27. Id. at 1000.
28. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
29. Id. at 926-27.
30. Id. at 916.
31. Id at 921.
32. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
33. See id. at 982. District 18, in the Houston area, had a population which was 51%
African-American and 15% Hispanic. See id. at 973. District 29, adjacent to District 18,
had a population which was 61% Hispanic and 10% African-American. See id. District
30, in the Dallas area, had a population which was 50% African-American and 17.1%
Hispanic. See id. at 965. The districts were invalidated because they were irregularly
shaped, and the Court found no other explanation for that than race. See id. at 972-73,
976.
34. 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
35. See id at 333.
36. See id at 338.
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37
In A PersonalPerspective on North Carolina Gerrymandering,
Robinson Everett proposes the establishment of an independent
redistricting commission to redraw voting district lines when required.
The commisson would act according to race-neutral, traditional
guidelines, except to the extent that Gingles might require some
consideration of race as a factor. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and David Lublin
contend, in Drawing Effective Minority Districts:A Model and Some
Empirical Evidence," that the Voting Rights Act, properly
interpreted and applied, should go beyond the provision of
deliberately-created majority-minority districts, defined by the
relative percentages of their minority and white voter populations.
They advocate the case-by-case analysis of individual voting
jurisdictions to determine exactly what percentage of minority voters
is required to enable the minority to elect representatives of their
choice, and the race-conscious creation of districts to ensure that
result.
Poised, as we are, at the beginning of a new year, of a new
century, and of a new millennium, the question, "Where do we go
from here?" takes on an even deeper profundity than usual. Perhaps
the past can provide us with insight, given the cyclical nature of race
and politics in the United States. We began with the complete
exclusion of African Americans from the political process. The next
stage in the cycle was the struggle for African Americans to enjoy the
same right to vote as white citizen counterparts. Eventually, with the
support of Congress and the Supreme Court, the right was secured in
the letter of the law. Having obtained that right, we entered a period
of tenacious attempts to block its exercise, and where exercised, to
dilute its effect. Concurrently, in response to the apparent futility of
attempting to share in the promise of a democratic society, we saw
consistently low African-American voter registration and virtually no
African-American elected officials, prompting widespread apathy or
anger. But still some refused to give up the struggle.
Enter, again, a sympathetic Congress and a sympathetic Court,
passing legislation, supporting its enforcement, and authorizing
remedial action and preventive measures intended to ensure that
African Americans, and other minorities, would be able to participate
fully and meaningfully in the electoral process. And immediately, we
saw again, that when racially discriminatory voting practices and

37. Everett, supra note 15, at 1328-31.
38. Bernard Grofman et al., Drawing Effective Minority Districts:A Model and Some
EmpiricalEvidence, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1383,1423 (2001).
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procedures are removed as obstacles, minorities can and will take
their rightful place as participatory members of our democracy. And
the cycle continues, as it historically has, with current reactionary
efforts to curb recent progress. The attack on minority voter equality
is more sophisticated now than before. The weapons used against
minorities are the ones originally created to protect them, primarily,
the Equal Protection Clause, and the application of strict scrutiny to
race-conscious state action.
Speaking from my own perspective, as a long-time participant in
the struggle to secure equal and meaningful enfranchisement for
African Americans, the Supreme Court's current retreat from its
earlier support of the Voting Rights Act is a threat, not only to
African Americans and other minorities, but to our entire system of
democratic government. When one is denied the right to vote, or
when one's vote is rendered an exercise in futility, the entire nation
suffers. The shock waves sent throughout this country and around
the world by the impact of the disenfranchisement of thousands of
Florida voters in the presidential election of 2000 illustrates this point.
In particular, I was distressed to hear the disillusionment expressed
by many African-American young people, Some of whom had just
voted for the first time in that election. The question most often
asked by young blacks disillusioned by the American political process
is, "Why bother?" That was the immediate impact. The ultimate
impact is yet to be fully appreciated. In fact, the ultimate impact is
yet to be determined because it will depend, in large part, on the
signals sent in the next few years. Cases are pending that will send a
signal, one way or the other, to all American citizens about the extent
to which each of our votes are valued, protected, and guaranteed to
be counted. 9
39. The Supreme Court ruled that a trial will be held in the ongoing legal battle over
the 12th Congressional District in North Carolina. In spite of the minority population in
that district having been reduced from approximately 55%, originally, to 47% in 1997,
opponents continue to seek its invalidation as a racially gerrymandered district. One
might view it as a hopeful indicator that the Supreme Court declined to simply affirm the
district court's holding in favor of the plaintiffs. On the other hand, the defeats the State
suffered in Shaw I and Shaw II do not bode well for the coming litigation. Shaw v. Hunt,
517 U.S. 899 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
On January 10, 2001, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., filed
a lawsuit alleging that several voting practices and procedures employed by the State of
Florida, in the general election of November 2000, violated the Voting Rights Act, and the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. NAACP v. Harris, No. 01-CIV-120-GOLD (S.D.
Fla. filed Jan., 10, 2001). The plaintiffs ask that the state of Florida be ordered to stop
those practices immediately, and to implement fair and non-discriminatory procedures.
IM The court's disposition of these cases, among others, will send a signal to Americans
about the value of our votes.
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Disillusionment resulting from the perception that the votes of
some individuals or groups may be wasted efforts is likely to result in
diminished participation in the political process by those who feel
disenfranchised, functionally, if not literally. An often overlooked,
but equally compelling ramification, is that when the ultimate
outcome of an election seems predetermined, majority voters have as
much reason to ask, "Why bother?" as the disenfranchised. The
legitimacy of our democracy depends upon ensuring that each
individual, regardless of race, has an equal opportunity to participate
in the political process in a meaningful way.

